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ARTICLES
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES:
CONTROLLING SYSTEMIC RISK
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein*
In the interest of protecting the system of intermediation
between savings and business working capital, the necessity of
prudential regulation for depositary intermediaries has always
been recognized in the United States and elsewhere. Whether
chartered as banks or chartered as securities firms, firms that
are major participants in the wholesale securities markets also
need prudential supervision to ensure that they do not fail. This
latter proposition, however, has been recognized only much more
recently with the arrival of the technology for the instantaneous
global transfer of payments for, and settlement of, securities
trading.1 The electronic payments system described in a New
York Times Magazine article2 has been in existence since the
1960s, but the participants and the regulators have, apparently,
preferred not to talk in public fora about the fragility of the sys-
tem or about the fact that no central bank is willing to guaran-
tee the payments put through the system by banks originating
* Professor, Boston College Law School; Special Consultant, Milbank, Tweed, Had-
ley & McCloy, New York. The original version of this paper was presented at the Brook-
lyn Law School Symposium on Global Trends Toward Universal Banking, Nov. 9, 1992. I
am grateful to the commentator on my paper, Professor Michael Klausner, for causing
me to rethink my presentation of the topic. I am also grateful to my research assistant at
Boston College Law School, Jonathan Hugg, for his research help in connection with the
Market Reform Act.
1. For the first time, to the author's knowledge, the extraordinary risks to the inter-
national financial system that are created by the funnelling of over 90% of all the world's
dollar payments through a computer system in New York hhve appeared in the popular
media. Peter Passell, Fast Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, (Magazine), at 42.
2. Id.
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from its jurisdiction.
It is not often realized that the electronic transfer system
within the United States borders, Fed Wire, is in effect under-
written by the United States central bank. The Federal Reserve
(Fed) guarantees to each bank receiving a payment that if the
sending bank fails, the Fed will make payment to the recipient,
thus permitting the recipient banks to treat transfers made
through the system as cash in hand upon arrival of the order. On
the contrary, as Peter Passell describes in his New York Times
Magazine article,3 no bank participating in the international dol-
lar payment system through the Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ments Systems (CHIPS) can be assured that it has received a
payment until settlement at the end of the day. Indeed, what
might happen if one of the banks putting payments through
CHIPS should be unable to pay what it owes at the end of the
day gives the industrialized world's regulators chills. Since the
banks in the system receive enormous payment orders from se-
curities firms in the capital markets, they are, in effect, by exe-
cuting the orders, extending credit to those firms unless they
have received payment for the orders before sending them.
Therefore, to the extent that a major securities firm was to fail
and be unable to put a CHIPS bank in funds, the entire system
would be at risk from this failure. Thus, in a very real sense,
major players in the international securities markets are also
"too-big-to-fail.
' '4
1 While it is true that in 1990 the securities firm of Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (Drexel) was allowed to fail and
an orderly liquidation was carried out without undue market
tremors, this description of events surrounding the failure of the
broker-dealer Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (DBL) is far too
simple. It is true that the liquidation of the broker-dealer was
carried out without incident, but the parent company had been
withdrawing capital from the broker-dealer until ordered to stop
by the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Division of
Market Regulation and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the broker-dealer's examining authority. As the Division has
written in the preamble to its Proposed Rule Amendment, Net
Capital Rule; Prohibited Withdrawal by Registered Broker-
3. Passell, supra note 1, at 42.
4. For the proposition that governments do act to prevent failure of their largest
banks, see RICHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION 10-13 (1992).
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Dealers:
Had the Commission and the NYSE not intervened when they
did, Drexel would have continued to withdraw funds out of
DBL and probably would have continued until the broker-
dealer's early warning level was reached. Especially in light of
Drexel's precarious financial position and the uncertainty with
respect to DBL's valuation of its high yield portfolio, this
would have created the risk that the broker-dealer's customers
and its counterparties would have been subjected to a liquida-
tion under the Securities Investor Protection Act.5
Note the suggestion in this statement by the SEC's Division of
Market Regulation that a liquidation of Drexel under the Secur-
ities Investor Protection Act e would not have been. an orderly
one without effect upon the markets. Is the SEC saying here
that Drexel could not have been allowed to fail where the Secur-
ities Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC), the securities
firms' equivalent of the banks' Bank Insurance Fund, would
have been involved? Or was the SEC here recognizing what is
often referred to as "systemic risk," the risk described above as
destruction of the global payments system by the failure of a
major participant? If the SEC was recognizing systemic risk,
this recognition is a new one for a securities regulator. Prior to
the 1980s, securities regulators had tended to view their function
primarily as insuring the integrity of the markets, truth in secur-
ities selling, and, subsidiarily, the oversight of net capital re-
quirements to insure that when a firm failed, the firm had suffi-
cient liquidity to return to the customers their securities and
free credit balances when the firm was closed.'
By the late 1980s, however, the OECD" set up an Ad Hoc
Group on Securities Markets under the chairmanship of Mr. M.
E. Hewitt of the Bank of England. The purpose of the Ad Hoc
Group was to prepare an extensive report on the nature and
functioning of the global financial system, a clear recognition of
5. 55 Fed. Reg. 34,027, at 34,029 (1990).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(3) (1988).
7. See, e.g., Gary Haberman, Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment
Banks: Contrasts in Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REv., Autumn 1987, at
1-10.
8. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was cre-
ated in 1961; its purposes include contributing "to the development of the world econ-
omy... and the expansion of world trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis in
accordance with international obligations." ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, SYSTEMIC RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS 2 (1991).
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the involvement in the health of the system of financial in-
termediaries trading in the global securities markets. The OECD
published this report in 1991 under the title, Systemic Risks in
Securities Markets.9 The description in the report of the
"[i]nterdependence and volatility of securities markets" 10 is a
convincing delineation of why adequate prudential supervision
of securities dealers active in the international financial markets
is as important as prudential supervision of the credit and trans-
action risks undertaken by international banks.11
Even before the OECD Ad Hoc Group began its work, Bevis
Longstreth, a United States SEC Commissioner, published an
article in 1983 entitled, Averting a Chain Reaction Disaster in
the Money World.12 There, he gave examples of crises for bro-
ker-dealers, as well as describing the Penn Square crisis in the
banking sector, and argued that all of the situations were:"
examples of how, with increasing frequency, the difficulties of a
single financial institution threaten to trigger a chain reaction,
extending well beyond the entities immediately involved. And
they suggest the need for a [g]overnment safety net, at the
ready and capable of moving swiftly, to supply liquidity and
act in other ways necessary to protect the stability of our na-
tion's financial system.14
Very recently, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Mr. Alan Greenspan, spoke before the
Federation of Bankers' Association of Japan. He entitled his talk
International Financial Integration and warned of the possible
difficulties caused by technological changes that have been "ac-
celerating the rapidity with which payments are made and se-
curities. transferred in the United States and around the
world."1 5 Chairman Greenspan, apparently speaking not only of
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8-11.
11. Once again, for the proposition that governments do regularly intervene to pre-
vent the closing of their major banks, see DALE, supra note 4, at 10-13. Professor Dale,
however, does not seem to consider the major securities firms a risk to the system unless
they are affiliated with banks. He appears to take the view that lone securities firms do
not involve risks to- the financial system however much they may need regulation to in-
sure transparency in the markets and fairness to consumers. DALE, supra note 4, at 10-
13.
12. Bus. & Soc'y RE v., Summer 1983, at 32-36.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. at 33-34.
15. Alan Greenspan, International Financial Integration, Remarks Before the Feder-
[Vol. XIX:I
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international banks, but also of international securities firms,
continued on to say:
In retrospect it appears that the transition from manual, paper
based systems to electronics may not have been managed by
those sufficiently sensitive to credit and risk exposures ... only
after the fact did we all become aware that the financial sys-
tems were at risk with serious implications for world markets. 16
The focus of this paper, therefore, is not on the risks to
banks of engaging in securities activities or a discussion of
whether it is possible to allow United States banking organiza-
tions to join in the trend toward universal banking by permit-
ting them to have affiliated securities firms. 17 This paper does
not address the question of risk to a deposit guaranty scheme by
operation of a universal bank or the affiliation of securities busi-
ness with banking business; rather, the piece addresses current
efforts to deal with the systemic risks presented by securities ac-
tivities and financial intermediation.
Just as there are large banking organizations so involved in
global payments that their possible failure involves systemic
risk, there are also large securities firms whose collapse could
have systemic consequences."" The issue of systemic risk in-
ation of Bankers' Association of Japan 3 (Oct. 14, 1992) (on file with Brooklyn Journal
of International Law).
16. Id.
17. The Treasury Bill, S. 713, implementing the Treasury Department Study, Mod-
ernizing the Financial System, Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks
(excerpts reprinted in 56 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 6, at 270 (Feb. 11, 1991) would have
permitted financial services holding companies with enhanced capital requirements to
own both depositary banks and full-scale broker-dealers, so long as the broker-dealers
were a separately incorporated subsidiary. S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201, 202
(1991). The Treasury appears to have thought that the requirement of separate incorpo-
ration of the securities business would insulate the United States safety net for deposi-
tary banks from the risks incurred by the financial services holding company in the se-
curities business. Professor Richard Dale's book, supra note 4, offers extensive argument
as to why the financial health of depositary institutions cannot be protected in this way.
However that may be, it is the thesis of this paper that securities firms that operate as
broker-dealers in the international markets, whether free standing, separately affiliated
with a banking institution, or operated as a department of a chartered bank, involve
systemic risk for the global markets and must be subject to adequate supervision on a
conglomerate basis.
18. This possibility has been "officially" recognized in the introduction to the re-
cently released International Organization of Securities Commissions' (IOSCO) Techni-
cal Committee's report cited below.
However the growth of very large securities firms turning over large volumes of
securities on a daily basis has meant that the collapse of such a firm could have
systemic consequences. This could happen, for example, where there appear,
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XIX:1
volves not universal.banking, but the size of the participants in
the global markets. There is no trend toward universal banking.
Universal banking in the sense of the combination of investment
banking, insurance, and commercial banking is an existing part
of the global financial system. The United States is an outlier in
its continued insistence on permitting financial conglomerates
containing a commercial bank to have only a very restricted in-
vestment banking business. The important question to be asked
about such financial conglomerates is not whether they should
be regulated by requiring the separation of the investment bank-
ing business into a separate subsidiary. 9 Rather, the question is
what are the appropriate principles for adequate supervision of
entities, whether they be large securities firms or large banks or
a combination thereof on the universal model, that present sys-
temic risks. This paper will briefly describe a number of recent
initiatives which are attempting to deal with this question by
articulating methodologies of risk assessment of the conglomer-
ate in which such a financial institution is contained. The paper,
thus, will cover a range of developments, including the portions
superficially, to be sufficient liquid assets to repay all liabilities without loss to
customers and counter parties, but the sheer size of the positions requiring
liquidation makes it difficult to liquidate these quickly and without moving the
market adversely. There could also be systemic consequences where the size of
security deliveries and payments due from the failed security firm could cause
significant problems for counterparties if there were any delay at all in the
firm's meeting its commitments and this could conceivably cause gridlock in
the settlement and payment systems. The failure of such a securities firm
might have a ripple effect spreading widely through the securities industry and
the financial system as a whole and could trigger a general lack of confidence.
TECHNICAL CoMMIrTE's REPORT, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF FINAN-
CIAL CONGLOMERATES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMIS-
SIONS, IOSCO Doc. 7, at 7, 11 (1992) [hereinafter IOSCO Principles].
Indeed, the United States Congress seems to recognize this possibility in recently ex-
tending to nonbank investment firms the ability to borrow under certain circumstances
directly from the central bank, thus recognizing that the failure of such firms could also
pose issues of systemic risk. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 4-1(4), 105 Stat. 2236 (1992). See also Dr. Thomas F. Hu-
ertas, The Regulation of International Financial Conglomerates; The Importance of Mar-
ket Supervision, Address Before the XVII Annual Conference of IOSCO, London (Oct.
29, 1992) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
19. It may be that, for internal reasons- involving the inability of a particular coun-
try to limit adequately the responsibility of its deposit guaranty scheme to protect small
depositors, it is necessary to provide a particular structure that seems more appropriate
to the protection of the safety net. This, however, is an argument for a particular struc-
ture to protect the deposit guaranty scheme, not an argument for a particular structure
to permit universal banking.
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of the United States Market Reform Act20 that permit the SEC
to judge the financial impact of significant affiliates upon a regu-
lated broker-dealer; the recent amendments by the SEC to its
Net Capital Rule;21 the Fed's insistence upon individual capital
for broker-dealer subsidiaries, thus carrying out the Basle Ac-
cord's suggestion of non-consolidation of specific subsidiaries;
22
the recent Basle Minimum Standards for Supervision;23 and, fi-
nally, IOSCO's recently released Principles for the Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates.4
In the United States, the issue of adequate supervision for
prudential purposes of financial conglomerates did not come
into view until very recently. Since enactment of the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 195625 (BHCA), those entities traditionally
considered to present systemic risks, the large money-center
banks, have not been permitted to be affiliated with any compa-
nies, other than those found by the regulator in charge of super-
vision under the BHCA, the Fed, to be "so closely related to
banking as to be a proper incident thereto ....26 It is not nec-
essary, given the plethora of articles on the BHCA, as subse-
quently amended, to describe here just how this prohibition on
the affiliation of United States commercial banks with non-fi-
nancial entities has worked out.2 7 Suffice it to say that, given
that prohibition and the thorough-going banking type supervi-
sion and examination to which bank holding companies and
both their non-bank and bank subsidiaries are subjected, it is
not necessary to develop principles for risk assessment of affili-
ates of United States banks. It should be noted, however, that
the United States is virtually alone in providing such compre-
hensive supervision and examination of the affiliates of commer-
20. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (1990).
21. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-28 927, 56 Fed. Reg. 9124 (1991)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 240).
22. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
23. BASLE CoMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SU-
PERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUP-9 AND THEm CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS,
(July 6, 1992) [hereinafter Basle Minimum Standards].
24. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18.
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. 1989-1990) (§ 1845 repealed 1966).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
27. See, for recent journalism on the topic, Paul J. Mason & David A. Massey, Holes
in the Dike: The Riddled Barrier Between Banking and Insurance, 10 BANKING EXPAN-
SION REP. 1 (Jan. 21, 1991); see also Clyde Mitchell, The Affiliation of Foreign Banks
and Insurance Companies, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1992, at 3.
1993]
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cial banks.2 8
However, when the Fed decided that it would authorize the
acquisition by bank holding companies of broker-dealers under
the BHCA's standard of "so closely related to banking as to be
a proper incident thereto," 29 the Fed took special precautions to
insure that these entities, registered as broker-dealers and thus
subject to the primary oversight of the SEC, would present no
risk to the holding company or its subsidiary banks. The meth-
odology utilized for this goal is that of separately stated capital
requirements. At the present time, banks originating from over
twenty countries are subject to risk-based capital adequacy re-
quirements; the framework for which was articulated by the Ba-
sle Supervisors' Committee in its paper, International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards30 (Basle
Accord). Of the twenty countries, however, the United States is
the only one which applies the risk-based capital requirements
not only to all of its commercial banks subject to federal regula-
tion, but also to their bank holding companies.3 1 As the IOSCO
Principles point out, if a regulated entity subject to capital re-
quirements is able to count its investment in another regulated
entity as part of its own capital, while the second regulated en-
tity counts its parent's investment in it as its own required capi-
tal, this combination may "allow excessive gearing through the
recycling of capital. '3 2 The Basle Committee has expressed this
28. For the argument that commercial banks or their holding companies should be
permitted to own interests in non-banking entities, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Think-
ing the Unthinkable: What Should Commercial Banks Or Their Holding Companies Be
Allowed To Own?, 67 IND. L.J. 251 (1992). The article, however, does not address the
question of whether commercial companies should be permitted to own banking organi-
zations. Adoption of adequate systems of risk assessment along the lines suggested by
some of the documents discussed in this article should go far to aid consideration of that
possibility for restructuring of financial regulation in the United States. See, e.g., supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see, e.g., supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
30. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Re-
port on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 30
LL.M. 978 (June 1988) [hereinafter Basle Accord]. For the history of the adoption of the
Basle Accord, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, 30 I.L.M. 967 (June
1988).
31: While the holding companies have somewhat more leeway in what kind of capi-
tal counts as capital for the capital/assets ratio, essentially a bank holding company's
risk-based capital adequacy requirements are the same as those for its subsidiary banks
and the holding company requirements are imposed on a consolidated basis.
32. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 33-35. The IOSCO Principles in Annex 2
give examples of the full consolidation and the deduction method of accounting for regu-
latory capital. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 33-35.
144 [Vol. XIX'l
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idea (for banks, not bank holding companies) by providing that
"investments in subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial
activities which are not consolidated in national systems"3 3 shall
be deducted from the capital base for the purpose of calculating
the risk weighted capital ratio. The Basle Accord continues on to
explain:
The normal practice will be to consolidate subsidiaries for the
purpose of assessing the capital adequacy of banking groups.
Where this is not done, deduction is essential to prevent the
multiple use of the same capital resources in different parts of
the group. The deduction for such investments will be made
against the total capital base .... 34
In accordance with this method of control, while deciding to
permit bank holding companies to invest in broker-dealer sub-
sidiaries, the Fed, nevertheless, declined to permit the bank
holding companies to consolidate these so-called Section 20 sub-
sidiaries in their regulatory reports to the Fed for capital ade-
quacy purposes. 3 5 Thus, the bank holding company investment
in the stock of the broker-dealer subsidiary is deducted from the
calculation of the holding company's capital for the purpose of
the risk-based capital adequacy requirement. Moreover, each
holding company requesting permission to acquire the stock of
such a broker-dealer subsidiary has been required to submit a
separate capital plan for the broker-dealer. In addition, of
course, the broker-dealer subsidiaries are subject to the SEC's
completely separate Net Capital Rule." Thus, to the extent that
the Fed hopes to maintain bank holding company capital as a
source of strength for the subsidiary banks, that capital is fully
insulated from any risks originating from the Section 20 subsidi-
ary.3 7 If, in fact, the Fed does have the power to force bank hold-
ing companies to utilize their capital to support subsidiary
33. Basle Accord, supra note 30, at 24(ii).
34. Basle Accord, supra note 30, at T 24(ii).
35. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988), forbids affiliation of
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and firms "engaged principally"
in securities dealing and writing. Thus, in order to permit bank holding companies the
acquisition of broker-dealers, the Fed had to impose on the subsidiaries conditions insur-
ing that they were not "principally" engaged in the forbidden business - and the subsidi-
aries are referred to by the number of the statute they were found not to violate.
36. See Net Capital Rule, supra note 21.
37. See MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
1993]
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banks in trouble,38 then, in the case of United States bank hold-
ing companies' combination of commercial banking and securi-
ties dealing, the Fed would seem to have achieved the greatest
amount of insulation possible for the banking safety net.
In contrast to the above described scheme for United States
commercial banks, until 1988, the United States system for su-
pervision of registered broker-dealers was not in the least con-
cerned with broker-dealer affiliation with either its parent com-
panies or its non-broker-dealer sister companies or even its non-
regulated securities subsidiaries. The stock market crash of Oc-
tober 1987 brought home both to the SEC and apparently to
Congress in its hearings 9 the difficulties for regulated broker-
dealers that could be caused by the unsoundness of their unreg-
ulated associates. In June of that year, the SEC, in its legislative
recommendations to Congress, proposed broker-dealer holding
company system risk assessment legislation. Congress did adopt
the proposal in Section 4 of the Market Reform Act,40 and the
SEC implemented the statutory direction by issuing, in Septem-
ber, its 1991 Proposed Temporary Risk Assessment Rules41 and
in July of 1992, its Final Temporary Risk Assessment Rules.
42
These Temporary Risk Assessment Rules (Rules) became fully
effective on December 31, 1992. The SEC has entitled the Rules
"Temporary" because it wishes to reevaluate them "after some
experience is gained with the information obtained pursuant to
the temporary rules .... ,43 The Division of Market Regulation
is to prepare a study evaluating the effectiveness of the Rules
after they have been fully operative for two years, and the Divi-
sion's report will be issued for public comment.44 Thus, only in
38. This at the moment is not clear. The Fed claims it does have the power. The
proposition was challenged by MCorp and the case has been remanded on other grounds.
Id.
39. See Stock Market Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1609 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also John D. Dingell, Securities Market Reform Act of 1990,
H.R. Rep. No. 524, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8; Proposed Temporary Risk Assessment Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-29,635, 56 Fed. Reg. 44,014, at 44,016 (Sept. 6, 1991).
40. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432,104 Stat. 963 (1990).
41. Proposed Temporary Risk Assessment Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
29,635, 56 Fed. Reg. 44,014 (Sept. 6, 1991).
42. Final Temporary Risk Assessment Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,929,
57 Fed. Reg. 32,159 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249) [hereinafter
Final Rules].
43. Id. at 32,161.
44. Id.
[Vol. XIX:I
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two years will we have a full-scale review of the effectiveness of
the risk assessment procedure set up by the SEC.
A full-scale analysis of the Rules will not be attempted here,
but their general tendency will be described. It should be noted
that one of the few articles to describe the Rules in their pro-
posed form45 criticized the Rules on the grounds that "[t]he SEC
is not responsible ... for the soundness of holding company fi-
nancial structures. While the SEC may need to understand the
nature and extent of systemic risk in the securities market, it
does not need to regularly monitor those risks to fulfill its statu-
tory obligations."46 This author would suggest that the statutory
language of Section 4 of the Market Reform Act 47 indicates that
Congress considers that the SEC should have responsibility for
the oversight of the soundness of holding company financial
structures, at least insofar as the structures impact upon the
soundness of the broker-dealer.48 While the SEC is not a lender
of last resort, it certainly has access to the lender of last resort
and, indeed, in early November 1987, the first week after the
market crash of October 27, worked closely with the Fed to as-
sure that sufficient liquidity flowed from the banking system to
the major broker-dealers at risk in the crisis. It certainly is true
that the statutory language itself, as well as its implementation
in the Rules, does not provide for risk assessment by across-the-
board reporting from and oversight of all affiliates of registered
broker dealers. 9 In short, neither under the statute nor under
the Rules is the SEC performing the kind of consolidated super-
vision of securities firms and their mixed activity holding com-
panies, as those terms are used and as such consolidated super-
vision is required in the European Community's Consolidated
Supervision Directive.50 Instead, the Act requires the keeping of
records by the broker-dealer of the "financial and securities ac-
45. Roberta S. Karmel, Risk Assessment Reporting for Large Traders, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 16, 1992, at 3.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (1990).
48. Id.
49. The term "registered broker-dealer" is used here as a short-cut. Although the
text of Section 4 of the Market Reform Act covers registered brokers or dealers, regis-
tered municipal securities dealers, registered municipal securities brokers, and govern-
ment securities dealers, all for whom the SEC is the appropriate regulatory agency. The
statutory text makes different provisions for the different entities, but these details are
not considered in this discussion.
50. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
1993]
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tivities" and "the customary sources of capital and funding of"
its associated persons whose "business activities are reasonably
likely to have a material impact on the financial or operational
condition""1 of the broker-dealer.
It is clear from the preamble to the Final Rules that the
SEC thinks that the concern is with the financial condition of an
affiliate of the broker-dealer upon which the broker-dealer is "fi-
nancially dependent." The SEC gives as an example of such de-
pendencies, that the broker-dealer relies on the commercial pa-
per or other unsecured credit of its holding company for
financing.52 The SEC also gives as an example the situation
where the broker-dealer relies on the affiliate for "significant op-
erational facilities or services." '5 The SEC also believes that the
subsidiaries or sister corporations set up by broker-dealers to do
much of their new, risky business, such as bridge loans, transac-
tions in derivative products, merchant banking, venture capital
activities, or swaps dealing, should also be included in the cate-
gory of affiliates as to which reports are kept. 4 Again, in short,
the SEC's concern would seem to be the financial soundness of
the holding company systems. To the extent that the SEC does
not think that an ultimate manufacturing parent would be a fi-
nancial threat to the grandchild broker-dealer, the SEC does not
seem to think that reports from the ultimate holding companies
should be required. 5 However, the SEC refused to restrict the
reporting requirement, as requested by a number of commenta-
tors, to only those affiliates engaged in financial or securities
transactions. 6
The SEC's present concern with and interest in systemic
risk is demonstrated by the fact that broker-dealers not carrying
customer accounts with capital' under $20 million are exempted
from the requirements.5 7 However, the SEC did include, pre-
sumably because of its historic role as a consumer protection
agency, all firms with capital over $250,000 having customer as-
sets. 8 The SEC pointed out, in reply to commentators' protests,
51. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (1990).
52. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,161.
53. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,161.
54. The term utilized by the Final Rules is Material Associated Persons (MAP).
Final Rules supra note 42.
55. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,162.
56. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,162.
57. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,164.
58. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,164.
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that only 280 broker-dealers out of the approximately 5,600 bro-
ker-dealers that conduct a public business would be caught at
these levels.59 Finally, the SEC stressed that it plans "to focus
its efforts on the largest 50 to 75 broker-dealers. '60 Presumably,
the reason for this focus is, again, the concern with systemic
risk.
While, as is pointed out above, the SEC's Temporary Risk
Assessment Rules are hardly a full-blown consolidated supervi-
sion scheme, the SEC, in its March 5, 1991 Final Amendment to
its Net Capital Rule,61 has given itself greater power over insur-
ing that the parent company of the registered broker-dealer does
not strip that broker-dealer of more assets than, so far as we
now know,62 the Fed has over bank holding company parents of
commercial banks. Under the amendment, a broker-dealer must
notify the SEC in writing before withdrawals of equity capital
exceeding certain percentages of the broker's excess net capital
may be made. This "early warning" system will permit the SEC
to take advantage of the authority given to it by the Market Re-
form Act to insist that the excess net capital remains in the bro-
ker-dealer if the financial situation of the firm warrants it and is
an important tool for stability.
The Market Reform Act's risk assessment provisions as im-
plemented by the SEC's Temporary Rules appear mild indeed
when compared to the European Community's requirements in
the Council Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions
on a Consolidated Basis (Consolidated Supervision Directive). 3
It is not possible in an article of this scope to review in any de-
tail the process of Community lawmaking. Suffice it to say that
the national Member States will be required to carry out in their
national law the procedures for consolidated *supervision of
"credit institutions" (banks) set out in the Consolidated Super-
vision Directive. The Directive is very clear. It states that, for
supervision on a consolidated basis to be effective, it must be
applied to all banking groups, including those in which parent
undertakings are not "credit institutions. ' 64 The Directive
points out that Member States can refuse or withdraw the bank-
59. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,164.
60. Final Rules, supra note 42, at 32,165.
61. Supra note 21.
62. See supra note 38.
63. Council Directive 92/30, 1992 O.J. (L 110).
64. Id. art. 2.
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ing license "in the case of certain group structures considered
inappropriate for carrying on banking activities, in particular be-
cause such structures could not be supervised effectively."6 5
Moreover, the Directive recognizes that the Community is still
attempting to work out a Capital Adequacy Directive for market
risks of firms carrying on securities activities and that until this
directive comes into force, 6 the Consolidated Supervision Direc-
tive requires the competent authorities to include in consoli-
dated supervision "financial institutions which are principally
exposed to market risk in accordance with methods determined
by the authorities in light of the particular nature of the risks
involved. '6 7 Thus, for the moment, the banking supervisory au-
thorities in the European Community are required to include
any separately incorporated broker-dealers affiliated with banks
under their supervision in consolidated supervision.
The purpose of such supervision is stated in Article 3: "Su-
pervision of solvency, and the adequacy of owned funds [capital]
to cover market risks and control of large exposures, as governed
by the relevant Community acts in force . , "68 It is clear from
the Directive, however, that the supervisory authorities need not
require their bank holding companies to report on every affiliate
in order to comply with the Directive. Article 6 provides that, in
the case of mixed activity holding companies and their subsidi-
aries, which include at least one credit institution, the regulatory
authorities must approach the parent companies and "require
them to supply any information which would be relevant for the
purpose of supervising the credit institution subsidiaries."6 9
Thus, at the moment, in the Community, there is no re-
quirement for consolidated supervision of a securities firm that
is not linked to a bank. However, this situation will change as
soon as the Investment Services Directive7 0 is finally adopted by
65. Id. art. 3.
66. As this is written, the Community has reached agreement on the shape of its
"single passport" scheme for securities firms, see infra note 67, and the accompanying
Capital Adequacy Directive, but neither are now due to be implemented until January 1,
1996. See Clifford Chance, EC FIN. SERVICES NEWSLE=rIR, Jan. 1993, at 29.
67. Council Directive 92/30, art. 4, 1992 O.J. (L 110).
68. Id. art. 3.
69. Id. art. 6(1). A mixed activity holding company is defined as a parent company
that is neither a credit institution nor a financial holding company (i.e., a holding com-
pany whose subsidiaries are mainly credit institutions or financial institutions).
70. Amended Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services
in the Securities Field, 1990 O.J. (C 42).
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the Community, that directive being the one providing for Com-
munity-wide basic standards for supervision of stand-alone se-
curities firms.7 1 Securities firms that are subsidiaries of a bank
or a sister company of a non-banking company owning a bank
are subject, as indicated above, to the Consolidated Supervision
Directive.7 2 Thus, the Community does, or will as of the imple-
mentation date of the Consolidated Supervision Directive, re-
quire substantial supervision of any conglomerate containing an
entity licensed as a "credit institution" under Community rules
and is far along the road to requiring the same for any invest-
ment services firm that will be licensed under the Investment
Services Directive. 3
In working on its Consolidated Supervision Directive, the
European Community surely was aware of. the work of the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision to enhance its Basle Concor-
dat first issued in 1975 and revised in 1983.71 The Concordat was
issued as a result of the concern of the central banks of the
Group of Ten Countries7 5 (G-10) over the failure of Bank Her-
stadt in 1974 and the implications for the international financial
system of the failure of that bank.76 However, the - Concordat
merely divided up the respective supervisory jurisdictions of
home and host countries for banking supervision.7 7 To the con-
trary, the Minimum Standards for the Supervision of Interna-
tional Banking Groups and their Cross-border Establishments
78
71. Id. § 14.1.
72. Id. § 14.3.
73. Id. §§ 14.4, 14.5.
74. Basle Committee on Banking Requirements and Supervisory Practices (June
1983), 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983) [hereinafter Basle Committee]. The original 1975 Concordat
is reprinted in Internal Capital Markets; Recent Developments and Short-Term Pros-
pects, 7 INT'L MONETARY FUND 29-32 (1981).
75. The Group of Ten countries [hereinafter G-10] are actually twelve industrialized
countries, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States that first began cooperat-
ing in international monetary affairs under the IMF organized General Arrangements to
Borrow. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (2d ed.
1984).
76. Bank Herstadt was a small private German bank with large foreign exchange
dealings that had been put through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System.
When it was closed by the German authorities, there were significant consequences for
the participants in CHIPS and the G-10 central banks realized the fragility of the
system.
77. Basle Committee, supra note 74, at 900 ("[a]mong the first tasks. . .'was to seek
some general agreement about the respective roles of home country and host country
supervisors . . ").
78. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23.
1993]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
(Basle Minimum Standards), released on July 6, 1992 by the Ba-
sle Committee, with the endorsement of the central bank gover-
nors of the G-10, is intended to be a framework for harmonized
basic standards of supervision that all of the supervisory author-
ities presently enforcing the Basle Accord on capital adequacy"
will be "required" to follow. As the Basle Committee Press
Statement, releasing the Basle Minimum Standards indicates,
"[t]he minimum standards are designed to reinforce the so-
called Basle Concordat . . . in a context of continued rapid
growth of international banking activities and in the wake of ex-
perience gained in the supervision of seriously troubled interna-
tional banking institutions, notably Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International [BCCI]." 80 This, in short, is the banking
regulatory community's response to BCCI. Again, as the Press
Release indicates, "the minimum standards are designed to pro-
vide greater assurances that in the future no international bank
can operate without being subject to effective consolidated
supervision." 81
For the purposes of this article, the Basle Minimum Stan-
dards are of interest because they are to be applied, not just to a
parent bank, but to the ultimate parent of the "banking group,"
as a holding company family is termed in the Basle Minimum
Standards.2 If a holding company is headquartered in a differ-
ent country than its subsidiary bank that is applying to the
host-authority for approval to establish a branch, then the hold-
ing company supervisory authority must also meet the minimum
standards.83
This is the first time that the Basle Committee has ad-
dressed banking conglomerates. It must also be noted that, in
most parts of the world, banking conglomerates also include bro-
ker-dealers and that there are very few broker-dealers active in
the international capital markets (apart from United States bro-
ker-dealers that are statutorily prohibited from being affiliated
with United States banking organizations) that are not affiliated
79. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Introductory Note cited in note
30 not only gives the history of the adoption of the Basle Accord, it discusses the "legal
process" used by the Committee to ensure compliance with the standards.
80. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank For International Settlements,
Press Statement, at 1 (July 6, 1992).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 3.
83. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 4.
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with a bank. Thus, the Basle Minimum Standards will apply to
most financial conglomerates in the international capital mar-
kets other than the Merrill Lynches. The "Merrill Lynches" will
receive only United States SEC oversight under the Risk Assess-
ment provisions described above.
The four specific minimum standards that the bank's or
banking group's home country authority must meet are as
follows:
'1. The home country authority must capably perform con-
solidated supervision.
8 4
2. The establishment of the host-country "branch" should
receive prior consent from the home country supervisor.8 5
3. The home country supervisors must have the right to
gather information from cross border establishments, i.e., se-
crecy laws must not get in the way of prudential supervision on
a consolidated basis.86
4. Host country authorities must have the power to condi-
tion or prohibit entirely the foreign banking group's entry into
the host country if the minimum standards are not met.
8 7
According to the document, certain of the principles of the
Concordat and its 1983 supplement have been "reformulated as
minimum standards ... which G-I0 supervisory authorities ex-
pect each other to observe."88 It may be presumed that this
means that banking organizations originating from countries
whose supervision does not meet the minimum standard will be
refused the right to branch into the G-10 countries, or other spe-
cial conditions of entry will be applied to them. Like the Euro-
pean Community's Consolidated Supervision Directive, the Ba-
sle Minimum Standards provide that the home country
supervisory authority should receive "consolidated financial and
prudential information on the bank's or banking group's global
operations ... and assess the information as it may bear on the
safety and soundness of the bank or banking group." '89 Similarly,
the supervisory authority is to have the "capability to prevent
corporate affiliations or structures that either undermine efforts
to maintain consolidated financial information or otherwise hin-
84. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 3.
85. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 4.
86. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 5.
87. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 6.
88. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 1 (emphasis added).
89. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 3.
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der effective supervision of the bank or banking group .... ",,0
While there is no requirement that the financial state of
every entity in the banking group's universe be monitored, nev-
ertheless, it would seem that the national law must give to the
supervisory authority the ultimate capacity to make its own de-
cision as to which affiliates have an impact upon the financial
health of the bank and therefore must be included in the consol-
idated supervision. Under Basle's Minimum Standards, univer-
sal banks will be universally supervised.
But, as stated, there is one form of financial conglomerate to
which the Basle Minimum Standards will not be applied, essen-
tially because the G-10 banking supervisors are not involved in
oversight of any of the units of the conglomerate. This is the
conglomerate that does not have as a subsidiary at least one
"bank" or, as the term is in the European Community, "credit
institution." '91 This is where IOSCO, which held its 17th Annual
Conference in London in the last week of October 1992, comes
in."2 At the Conference, IOSCO's Technical Committee released
its document, Principles for the Supervision of Financial Con-
glomerates (IOSCO Principles). 3
At the present time, IOSCO has no system similar to that of
the Basle Committee for putting any form of pressure on its
member organizations to conform to such principles. The princi-
ples are, in effect, only precatory, but their promulgation rounds
out what might be referred to as a "soft law" regime for consoli-
dated supervision of financial conglomerates.9 4 As the Technical
Committee itself states in paragraph 16 of its Introduction, the
"general principles should form the basis for the risk assessment
of financial conglomerates and should be used, as far as possible,
to guide the development of regulatory practice and regulatory
90. Basle Minimum Standards, supra note 23, at 3-4.
91. The European Community First Banking Directive, at Article 2.2, defines a
credit institution as "an undertaking whose business is to receive repayable funds from
the public and to grant credit for its own account." Council Directive 77/780 of 12 De-
cember 1977 First Banking Directive, 1977 O.J. (L 322) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, Eurscp File, at *2.
92. For a history and description of IOSCO and its Technical Committee, see Lich-
tenstein, supra note 30, at 970-71.
93. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18.
94. The Technical Committee is particularly interested in certain conglomerates:
"Although the Technical Committee believes that the principles set out here are of rele-
vance to the question of conglomerate supervision generally, the main concern of the
Technical Committee is with groups where securities business plays a significant part."
IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 3, 2.
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co-operation in this area. ' 95 Without a doubt, they will be influ-
ential indeed.
Principle (a) of the IOSCO Principles is that risk assess-
ment should be "group based""6 if the regulated firm that is part
of the financial conglomerate is vulnerable to what the Princi-
ples call "the risk of contagion. '97 As paragraph 12 of the Intro-
duction to the Principles points out, "[e]ven where the failure of
a regulated securities firm is unlikely to have serious conse-
quences for the securities industry and the financial system gen-
erally, the risk of contagion means that it is highly desirable for
the securities regulator to have early warning of problems else-
where in the group."98 Thus, in effect, the Technical Committee
is recommending that "the traditional approach of securities
regulators to the prudential regulation of securities firms on a
solo basis should be complemented through an assessment of the
risk which the rest of the financial conglomerate poses for the
regulated securities firm." 99 In short, the Technical Committee,
in this international "soft law" regime, seems to be rejecting the
approach of the BHCA in favor of the much more limited ap-
proach of the SEC in its Temporary Risk Assessment Rules
under the Market Reform Act.
The remainder of the IOSCO Principles, however, go on to
be much more substantive. Since the focus of this paper has
been primarily on consolidated supervision of financial conglom-
erates, the remainder of the Principles will merely be mentioned
here. Any person interested in observing the regime for multina-
tional financial services companies will be well-advised to read
the IOSCO Principles in their entirety. Principle (b) concerning
the question of deduction from capital of an investment in an-
other group company has been previously mentioned.100 This
Principle recommends that the amounts counted toward regula-
95. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 10.
96. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 11.
97. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 11.
98. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 8.
99. However, paragraph 14 does go on to warn that:
[I]n all cases, the objective of group based risk assessment should be to en-
hance the regulation of the regulated firm. Every effort should be made to
avoid creating any impression hitherto unregulated entities in a financial con-
glomerate have been made de facto subject to regulation, or that the regulators
accept any responsibility for the prudential supervision as of the group as a
whole where this is not, in fact, the case.
IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 10.
100. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 17.
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tory capital should be controlled by appropriate regulations.10 1
Principle (c) indicates that effective risk assessments of financial
conglomerates require careful monitoring of intra-grpup expo-
sures and, where necessary, limits on such exposures in the regu-
lated entity.102 Principle (d) is the rather obvious principle that
the corporate and managerial structure of the financial conglom-
erate should be fully understood by the regulator.1 0 3 Principle
(e) concerns the equally obvious suggestion that regulators
should seek, as far as possible, to identify shareholders with such
a stake in the conglomerate as would enable them to exert mate-
rial influence. 0 4 Principle (f) suggests appropriate regulatory
standards for managers of a regulated entity.10 5 Principle (g)
urges supervisory cooperation and the desirability of appointing
a lead regulator where a group has, as is the case with a con-
glomerate having both a securities firm and a banking firm, two
separate regulatory authorities. °10 Finally, Principle (h) states
that, "[r]egulators should recognise the importance of the role of
the external auditors of a regulated firm and the possible contri-
bution they may be able to make to group-based risk
assessment.
' '10 7
The latter suggestion is one which, as of yet, our United
States securities supervisors have not begun to consider. How-
ever, Congress in its latest banking legislation, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,108 has deliber-
ated at length over the responsibility for audits of banking
institutions.10 9
Once again, for this author, the great interest of the IOSCO
Principles is that IOSCO's Technical Committee has articulated
standards for group-based risk assessment which take into ac-
count that a financial conglomerate, even though it may lack a
subsidiary bank, nevertheless may implicate systemic risk. As
the Principles articulate in paragraph 14 of the Introduction, in
101. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 17, 1 29.
102. This topic will be covered by the European Community in its Large Exposures
Directive. Directive on Monitoring and Control of Large Exposures, 1992 O.J. (C 175)
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurspc File, at *7.
103. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 21, % 39.
104. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 22, 42.
105. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 23.
106. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 24.
107. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 28, 53.
108. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1992).
109. Id. § 112.
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complementing prudential regulation of securities firms on a
solo basis with a group-based assessment:
... [T]he extent of this assessment may need to distinguish
between those securities firms whose operations give rise to
systemic risk and those which do not .. the greater 'the sys-
temic risk inherent in a'securities firm operations the more am-
bitious the approach to group-based risk assessment will need
to be.110
The issue is safeguarding the health of the international finan-
cial system through adequate group-based risk assessment for all
financial conglomerates, whether or not "universal banks," that
do pose issues of systemic risk. The IOSCO Principles, recently
released in London, are beginning to chart these new seas.
110. IOSCO Principles, supra note 18, at 9-10.

